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The Debate Over Consumer Arbitration Clauses
By Emily Rozwadowski
Predispute arbitration clauses are often
used by businesses in contracts with other
businesses. These clauses require the parties
to settle disputes in arbitration rather than in
court. However, these clauses are now being
added by businesses into their contracts with
consumers. These clauses also require consumers to settle disputes in arbitration. In addition, the clauses often preclude consumers
from bringing class action lawsuits.
Proponents of arbitration say there are
many advantages to the system. Arbitrations
are kept confidential, are governed by a national set of procedures, and require limited discovery. Proponents argue that predispute arbitration clauses are not necessarily unfair to
consumers. Arbitration lowers a business's
costs and these costs will be passed on to
other consumers.
The use of arbitration clauses in consumer contracts, however, is controversial.
Opponents of arbitration clauses in consumer
contracts say that the high cost of arbitration
may prevent consumers from seeking redress.
In addition, many clauses preclude class action
suits, which opponents say is harmful to con-

surmers.
"In general, I believe mandatory arbitration clauses are unfair," said Jean Sternlight,
Saltman Professor, University of Nevada-Las
Vegas, Boyd School of Law, and director,
Saltman Center for Conflict Resolution.
"People haven't entered into them in a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent way."
Sternlight argues that arbitration clauses are harmful to consumers because they are
imposed on consumers without the consumers' consent. "Because of the way the
clauses are imposed, companies can construct them in a way that is beneficial to them,"
Sternlight said.
Professor Mark Budnitz, a law professor at Georgia State University College of
Law, also believes arbitration clauses in consumer contracts are unfair because arbitrators
are not required to follow consumer protection
laws, there is no jury trial, and there is no way
for the consumer to appeal the award. Budnitz
also believes the clauses are unfair because
arbitration proceedings are kept private.
"Companies can hide their misdeeds
because arbitration proceedings are secret,"
Arbitration, continued on page 15
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Budnitz said. "So even if many arbitrations find
a company is cheating lots of people, there is no
public record so other consumers and law
enforcement people will not know."
In contrast, Prof. Stephen Ware of the
University of Kansas School of Law believes
that arbitration is ultimately beneficial to consumers. "Assuming that consumer arbitration
agreements lower the dispute resolution costs
of businesses that use them, competition will,
over time, force these businesses to pass their
cost savings to consumers," Ware said.
In addition, Ware believes that the potential benefits of all consumers should be considered when discussing arbitration clauses in consumer contracts. "An assessment of predispute
arbitration agreements, therefore, must not be
limited to a consideration of consumers with disputes. A proper assessment must consider
consumers as a whole," Ware said.
"Consumers without disputes are the main beneficiaries of the lower prices caused by arbitration agreements."

The issue of arbitration clauses in consumer contracts may not be so clear cut,
according to Chris Drahozal, another University
of Kansas law professor. "The basic idea is that
you can't tell simply by the fact of arbitration or
particular arbitration provisions in an arbitration
clause, such as waivers of punitive damages or
class relief, whether consumers are better or
worse off," Drahozal said. "It depends on the
conditions of a particular market."
Budnitz agrees that arbitration may be
beneficial to the consumer - when it is agreed
upon post-dispute. "After the dispute the consumer can make a rational decision whether
arbitration is the best way to go," Budnitz said.
Ware also stresses that arbitration is not
mandatory to consumers. "Those consumers
who do not wish to enter into arbitration agreements are under no obligation to do so," Ware
said. "Current law does not make arbitration
mandatory; it makes arbitration a matter of contractual choice." Ware believes that opponents
of predispute arbitration clauses in consumer
Arbitration, continued on page 16

Dell, Inc. Dispute Clause
By accepting delivery of the Product, you accept and are bound to the terms and conditions of this
Agreement. If you do not wish to be bound by this Agreement, you must notify Dell immediately and
:return your purchase pursuant to Dell's Total Satisfaction Return Policy.

Binding Arbitration. ANY CLAIM, DISPUTE, OR CONTROVERSY (WHETHER IN CONTRACT, TORT,
OR OTHERWISE, WHETHER PREEXISTING, PRESENT OR FUTURE, AND INCLUDING STATUTORY, COMMON LAW, INTENTIONAL TORT AND EQUITABLE CLAIMS) BETWEEN CUSTOMER AND
DELL, its agents, employees, principals, successors, assigns, affiliates (collectively for purposes of this paragraph, "Dell") arising from or relating to this Agreement, its interpretation, or the breach, termination or
ivalidity thereof, the relationships which result from this Agreement (including, to the full extent permitted by
applicable law, relationships with third parties who are not signatories to this Agreement), Dell's advertising,

or any related purchase SHALL BE RESOLVED EXCLUSIVELY AND FINALLY BY BINDING ARBITRATION ADMINISTERED BY THE NATIONAL ARBITRATION FORUM (NAF) under its Code of
Procedure then in effect ... Any award of the arbitrator(s) shall be final and binding on each of the parties, and:
:may be entered as a judgment in any court of competent jurisdiction. Dell will be responsible for paying any
arbitration filing fees and fees required to obtain a hearing to the extent such fees exceed the amount of the
filing fee for initiating a claim in the court of general jurisdiction in the state in which you reside. Each party
shall pay for its own costs and attorneys' fees, if any. However, if any party prevails on a statutory claim that
affords the prevailing party attorneys' fees, or if there is a written agreement providing for fees, the Arbitrator
,may award reasonable fees to the prevailing party, under the standards for fee shifting provided by law.
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contracts oppose the freedom of consumers to
cost of an arbitration standing alone, and the
enter into contracts. "What opponents of socost of an arbitration compared to the cost of
called mandatory arbitration really oppose is
court proceedings. In considering whether an
freedom of contract," Ware said. "In particular,
arbitration clause is unconscionable, the court
they oppose enforcement of a particular catewill consider the reasonableness of the contract
gory of contract, the predispute arbitration
and the purpose and effect of the terms of the
agreement."
contract. It is the burden of the plaintiff to prove
Opponents of arbitration clauses in conthat the clause is unconscionable.
sumer contracts believe that arbitration clauses
To protect consumers, Sternlight
that prohibit consumers from filing class actions
believes that congressional action is necessary.
are particularly harmful to consumers.
She would like Congress to prohibit companies
from using mandatory arbitration clauses that
According to Sternlight, arbitration clauses that
preclude consumers from filing class action
prohibit class actions. Congressional action,
according to Sternlight, is preferable to relying
suits are harmful to consumers because often it
is the only way a consumer can get relief. She
on courts to evaluate arbitration clauses in conadded that whether a
clause precluding class "The best wa y to protect consumers is to carve out
action is harmful depends an exception [in] the FAA (Federal Arbitration Act)
on the nature of the consumer's claim and the other as car dealers have done."
Prof Mark Budnitz,
options available to that
Georgia State
consumer.
Ware believes that
sumer contracts on a case-by-case basis
there are several factors to consider when
Sternlight said it is preferable because it woul d
deciding if an arbitration clause that prohibits
be more efficient and would eliminate the nee d
class actions should be enforced. "Anything
for individual plaintiffs. Individual plaintiffs ma y
that lowers businesses' costs, including reducbe hard to find because they do not know the y
tion in class actions they have to defend, ultihave a claim, they cannot afford to file a clairr 1,
mately tends to lower consumer prices," Ware
or they cannot find a lawyer to bring a clairr 1,
said. "But that's just one piece of information
according to Sternlight.
that might be relevant in deciding whether to
Budnitz agrees that CongressionE
enforce arbitration clauses barring class
action is needed to protect consumers. H e
actions. I think some of the strongest cases for
believes that pre-dispute mandatory arbitratio n
finding an arbitration clause unconscionable are
clauses should be prohibited in consumc r
cases in which large numbers of people have
cases. He also believes that Congression al
small dollar amount claims so the only cost
action is preferable to court action in individu al
effective way to bring the case is as a class
cases. "The best way to protect consumersi s
action."
to carve out an exception [in] the FAA (Federal
Currently, a consumer needs to go to
Arbitration Act) as car dealers have done,"
court to challenge an arbitration clause in a conBudnitz said. "Court cases cannot do that."
sumer contract. A consumer can have the court
However, Ware believes bills to prevent
find an arbitration clause unenforceable by
consumer arbitration clauses will be harmful to
proving that arbitration costs are prohibitively
consumers. "While purporting to advance the
high, or that the arbitration clause is unconinterests of consumers, the bills would likely
scionable. When deciding whether an arbitraharm most of those very people," Ware said.
tion clause is prohibitively high courts often consider the financial situation of the plaintiff, the
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